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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, ; 
Plaintiff / Appellee, ] 
vs. ] 
DIMITROS A. DESLIS, ] 
Defendant / Appellant. ] 
) Case No. 980269-CA 
i Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF TTTRTSDTCTTON 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3 (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE TSSTTF.S 
I. WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO CONVICT DESLIS? 
H. WAS TRIAL COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO REQUEST 
SPECIFICITY FROM THE TRIAL COURT? 
EI. DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR FOR FAILING TO BE 
SPECIFIC IN ITS FINDINGS? 
DETERMINATIVE PROVTSTON OR STATUTE 
The determinative ordinance that applies to this case is Salt Lake City Ordinance Section 
11.04.060 which states: 
A person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor if, with intent to hinder, prevent or delay the 
discovery, apprehension, prosecution, conviction or punishment of another for the 
commission of a crime, he/she: 
A. Conceals an offense from a magistrate, knowing it has been committed; 
B. Harbors or conceals the offender; 
C. Provides the offender a weapon, transportation, disguise or other means for avoiding 
discovery or apprehension; 
D. Warns such offender of impending discovery or apprehension; or 
E. Conceals, destroys or alters any physical evidence that might aid in the discovery, 
apprehension or conviction of such person; or 
F. Obstructs, by force, intimidation, distraction or deception, anyone from performing an act 
which might aid in the discovery, apprehension, prosecution or conviction of such person. 
(Prior code § 32-1-5.1) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant-Appellant, Dimitrios A. Deslis (hereinafter referred to as Mr. Deslis) was arrested 
for obstructing a police investigation. Mr. Deslis entered a not guilty plea. The case was tried before 
the Honorable A. Lee Dever, on April 23, 1998, and Mr. Deslis was found guilty. The trial court 
granted a stay of execution of Mr. Deslis' sentence pending his appeal before this Court. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On February 8, 1998, at approximately 2:50 a.m., two Salt Lake City Police Officers, 
Detectives Bryan Bailey and Mike Hatch were on duty outside Papyions Club located at 145 West 
Pierpont Avenue effecting two unrelated arrests. (Tr. 5, 20). They saw Mr. Deslis, whom they 
recognized enter the passenger side of a black Porsche automobile that was parked in front of 
Papyions. (Tr. 5, 20). A short while later they heard a crash and saw that the black Porsche had hit 
a Dodge Caravan automobile. (Tr. 5, 20). 
2 
Detective Hatch approached the black Porsche. However, before he reached the black 
Porsche, it left the scene going eastbound on Pierpont Avenue. (Tr. 21). After completing their 
unrelated arrests, Detectives Bailey and Hatch went to American Towers to speak with Mr. Deslis 
about the accident. (Tr. 7,22). They went to Mr. Deslis1 residence after finding the black Porsche 
in the American Towers parking terrace. (Tr. 15, 23). When questioned about the accident Mr. 
Deslis declined to identify the driver because the driver was a friend. (Tr. 8, 24). As a result, Mr. 
Deslis was arrested and charged with obstruction of justice. (Tr. 8, 24). On April 23, 1998, Mr. 
Deslis was tried before the Honorable Lee A. Dever and found guilty of the crime charged. (Tr. 40). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court heard testimony from the two Salt Lake City police officers, Mr. Deslis, and 
Tony Ouzounian, the driver of the black Porsche. At trial, Mr. Deslis claimed that he requested to 
have his attorney present before speaking with Detectives Bailey and Hatch. However, Detectives 
Bailey and Hatch refuted this claim, testifying that no such request was made. The trial court 
accepted the officers' testimony and gave little weight to Mr. Deslis' claim. Based on the evidence 
heard, the trial court found Mr. Deslis guilty of the offense as charged. The trial court's ruling 
should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHES THE APPELLANT'S GUILT. 
In reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the evidence, this Court has reasoned that the 
trial court's judgment is sustained unless it is "against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the 
appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." 
State v. Layman, 953 P.2d 782 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citing State v. Reed 839 P.2d 878, 879 
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(Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citations omitted). 
In the instant case, the trial court's decision was based on the testimonial evidence of 
Detectives Bailey and Hatch, Mr. Deslis, and Tony Ozounian. Detectives Bailey and Hatch 
personally observed Mr. Deslis enter the car involved in a hit and run accident. Unaware as to the 
identity of the driver and recognizing Mr. Deslis, they went to his residence as part of their 
investigative protocol. Mr. Deslis refused to identify the driver of the black Porsche and was 
arrested and charged with obstruction of justice. 
Mr. Deslis testified that his refusal was based on his request to have his attorney present. 
However, Detectives Bailey and Hatch testified that no such requested was made during the course 
of their discussion with him. The trial court found the officers' testimony to be credible and 
declared Mr. Deslis guilty of the crime as charged. 
The trial court's verdict based on the evidence presented should be upheld. The evidence 
indicates that Mr. Deslis intended to prevent the discovery, apprehension and prosecution of the 
driver of the black Porsche. As such, the trial court appropriately found Mr. Deslis guilty of 
obstruction of justice . Salt Lake City ordinance, § 11.04.060 identifies six separate acts which 
constitute obstruction of justice. 
Harboring or concealment are among the six enumerated acts. Harboring or concealment do 
not require an affirmative act of hiding, giving shelter or refuge to a suspected offender. For 
example, concealment by definition includes "...withholding from the knowledge of others..., or 
preventing the discovery of..." Black's Law Dictionary 288 (6th ed. 1990 ). Mr. Deslis' actions 
when questioned about the accident satisfies this definition and supports the trial court's ruling. 
Because Mr. Deslis was a witness and not a suspect, the trial court appropriately declined to 
address Mr. Deslis' Fifth Amendment claim. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
4 
states in pertinent part that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself" Utah's counterpart, found in article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution, provides that 
"the accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself" In questioning the appellant, 
the officers were not compelling him to be a witness against himself. Moreover, there was no 
evidence that Mr. Deslis was reasonably apprehensive about disclosures which "could be used in a 
criminal prosecution or which lead to other evidence that might be so used.'" In re Gault, 387 U.S. 
I, 47-48, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1454, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967) (citation omitted). 
Absent a finding of clear error, this Court should defer to the trial court's consideration of 
the evidence and particularly the trial court's ability to judge the credibility of the witnesses 
consistent with the standard set forth in Rule 52a of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
II. APPELLANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE 
Mr. Deslis' trial counsel, Edward D. Flint, Esq., was not ineffective for failing to have the 
trial court specify which provision of the ordinance was violated. According to the Strickland test, 
appellant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim requires a showing that (1) trial counsel rendered 
a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner which fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment and, (2) that trial counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674,104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). (See also State 
V. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439,441 (Utah 1996); Taylor v. Warden, 905 P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995); 
Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 966, 130 L. Ed. 2d 344, 115 
S.Ct. 431 (1994)). 
Mr. Deslis1 belief that his trial counsel's failure to request specificity was prejudicial is 
speculative. The trial court's ruling based on the weight of the evidence presented is not inadequate 
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for lack of specificity about the particular provision of the ordinance the appellant violated. 
Assuming arguendo, that specificity is required, this Court should remand for the entry of detailed 
findings. 
In considering Mr. Deslis' ineffectiveness of counsel claim; this court should consider two 
important principles essential to the two prong Strickland test. First, the strong presumption that trial 
counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Second, given 
Mr. Deslis1 burden to meet both parts of the Strickland test, it is unnecessary for this Court to apply 
both parts should its inquiry reveal that one part is not satisfied. State v. Marvin, 1998 Lexis 35 
(Utah) (citations omitted). 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO BE SPECIFIC IS NOT PLAIN ERROR. 
The trial court's ruling does not constitute "plain error" because of lack of specificity. In 
order to establish plain error, Mr. Deslis, as appellant must show that " (i) an error exists; (ii) the 
error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful." State v. Dunn, 850 
P.2d 1201,1208 (Utah 1993). In considering Mr. Deslis' plain error claim, this Court should first 
determine if there was any harm or prejudice. Absent a finding of either harm or prejudice, this court 
need not consider the other elements of plain error analysis identified. Marvin, 1998 Lexis 35 
(Utah). 
If the trial court erred by not being specific, the error was harmless, not prejudicial. 
Additionally, if this Court determines that the trial court erred by not being specific with its finding, 
the remedy is not reversal but remand to the trial court for entry of a more detailed finding. 
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CONCLUSION 
The record supports the trial court's verdict, finding Mr. Deslis guilty of the offense of 
obstruction of justice. Mr. Deslis' trial counsel's representation should not be deemed ineffective 
because he failed to demand specificity regarding the trial court's finding. Finally, even if the trial 
court erred in failing to be specific, the error was not plain error but harmless error. Consequently, 
this court should affirm the trial court's verdict. 
Respectfully submitted this <^ day of October, 1998. 
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ADDENDUM 
Chapter 11.04. OFFENSES BY OR AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICERS AND GOVERNMENT 
11.04.060. Obstruction of justice. 
A person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor if, with intent to hinder, prevent or delay the 
discovery, apprehension, prosecution, conviction or punishment of another for the commission of 
a crime, he/she: 
A. Conceals an offense from a magistrate, knowing it has been committed; 
B. Harbors or conceals the offender; 
C. Provides the offender a weapon, transportation, disguise or other means for avoiding 
discovery or apprehension; 
D. Warns such offender of impending discovery or apprehension; or 
E. Conceals, destroys or alters any physical evidence that might aid in the discovery, 
apprehension or conviction of such person; or 
F. Obstructs, by force, intimidation, distraction ot deception, anyone from performing an 
act which might aid in the discovery, apprehension, prosecution or conviction of such person. 
(Prior code § 32-1-5.1) 
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